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DONOR CHARACTERISTICS AND THE SUPPLY OF 
CLIMATE MITIGATION FINANCE 
 
 
 
The paper examines the links between donor country characteristics and international 
mitigation finance. We make use of an extensive panel dataset to show that donors that 
reserve a larger amount of domestic financial resources for environmental purposes 
display lower commitment towards mitigation finance overseas. On the other hand, 
donors with left-wing governments and good institutions exhibit weaker commitment 
towards overseas mitigation finance. We also find important discrepancies when 
comparing donor behaviour in terms of original commitment and actual disbursement. 
For the latter, it is only income per capita and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol that 
matters – there is no evidence that a high level of CO2 emissions per capita at home 
influences the disbursement of mitigation finance.  
 
Keywords: Climate mitigation finance; development aid; ODA; donors. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years many scholars have attempted to define the motives behind the 
supply of overseas development assistance (ODA). It is commonly argued that donors’ 
motives extend beyond the altruistic objective of improving the economy and well-
being of people in developing countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006; 
Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay and Little, 1977; 
Trumbull and Wall, 1994). Lewis (2003) argues that this also applies to the case of 
environmental aid. The economic and political interests of donors are often much 
stronger determinants of environmental aid than the environmental needs of the 
recipient countries. In the past decade there has also been a significant increase in 
bilateral ODA aimed at funding activities that tackle climate change (Ballesteros and 
Moncel, 2010; Bierbaum and Fay, 2010; Brown et al., 2010; ICTSD, 2010; 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007).  
 
With a more specific focus than environmental ODA, official mitigation finance 
largely aims at minimising GHG emissions. To date there is limited information as to 
why some donors provide more mitigation finance than the others. There is no 
literature empirically investigating the linkages between donors’ economic, political 
and institutional characteristics and corresponding provision of official mitigation 
finance. Our study contributes to the literature by empirically examining the role of 
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several characteristics of the 22 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in 
defining their mitigation finance commitment and disbursement (as a share of overall 
ODA) between 1998 and 2009. The 22 DAC countries are: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Luxembourg is not 
included due to the limited number of observations available. We define mitigation 
finance as projects funded by ODA that fall under the Organisation Economic 
Cooperation and Development Creditor Reporting System (OECD CRS, 2011a). The 
CRS 1998-2009 data on climate mitigation finance classify projects funded by ODA 
into seven categories: (1) only climate change, (2) only biodiversity, (3) 
desertification, (4) biodiversity and climate change, (5) desertification and climate 
change, (6) biodiversity, desertification, and climate change and (7) others. In our 
analysis we include projects for which climate change mitigation is either the principal 
or a significant objective (the latter activities have other primary objectives but also 
significantly contribute to climate mitigation - a detailed description of all variables is 
provided in Section 2).  
 
The percentage of ODA allocated to mitigation finance has been on the rise 
(both in terms of original commitment and actual disbursement, see Fig. 1). Between 
1998 and 2009, the commitment of mitigation finance rose from US$1.2 to US$9.2 
billion (i.e. by 7.6 times).  There was also a nine-fold increase from US$600 million to 
US$5.4 billion with respect to the actual mitigation finance disbursed between 2002 
and 2009 (the years for which data are available). Mitigation finance disbursement has 
been consistently lower than commitment. Donors take several years to meet the 
amount of mitigation finance they have committed to provide. Interestingly, the 
disbursement-commitment gap narrowed between 2007 and 2008 and as a whole 
mitigation finance disbursement grew faster than mitigation finance commitment (Fig. 
2). 
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Note: All figures in this study are constructed by the author based on data from OECD (2011b) 
 
Figure 1: Trend in mitigation finance commitment and disbursement 
 
Our study also compares data across donors. Japan is the largest climate 
mitigation finance donor followed by Germany. Japan only started to report data on 
its climate finance commitment in 2002, but it has made the largest contribution to 
mitigation finance both in absolute values and as a proportion of total ODA (see Fig. 
2). It allocated 12.5% of its total ODA from 2002 to 2009 to mitigation finance with 
a cumulative value close to US$20 billion.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Donors' commitment to mitigation finance (1998-2009) 
 
To develop an empirical framework for the correlation between donors’ 
characteristics and mitigation finance, this paper draws on the wider literature 
investigating the links between donor characteristics and general development or 
environmental aid. For example, the study by Chong and Gradstein (2008) claims that 
countries with higher levels of income per capita and citizen satisfaction with 
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government performance tend to provide more foreign aid in general. Hicks et al. 
(2008) examine the relationships between environmental aid provision and donor 
characteristics using data from the Project-Level Aid Database (known as Aid Data 
2.0). They find that wealthier bilateral donor countries are likely to allocate more aid 
towards green projects with global benefits, although their results are not robust to 
including unobserved time-variant variables or adopting alternative specifications. 
They find no evidence that institutional/political characteristics, such as the strength of 
environmental lobby groups, affect the allocation of aid for environmental purposes. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to identify the determinants 
behind climate mitigation finance at the donor level.  The study by Hicks et al. (2008) 
is the closest to the subject of our research, although with a wider focus on broader 
environmental aid. Our study advances knowledge in the field by linking climate 
mitigation finance more specifically with donor characteristics (with a particular focus 
on the climate change relevant factors, such as the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions per capita or ratification of the Kyoto Protocol).  
 
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the hypotheses tested in this paper and explain the 
econometric methods employed; section 4 empirically studies the connection between 
donor characteristics and the provision of mitigation finance in total ODA. This 
section also compares mitigation finance commitment and disbursement to reflect on 
discrepancies between the two. Section 6 discusses alternative indicators of mitigation 
finance and their determinants. Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 provides a detailed 
explanation of mitigation finance reporting and data under CRS.  
 
2. Research Hypotheses 
 
Below we discuss the hypotheses that are empirically tested in this study and 
which aim to link the supply of climate mitigation finance to donor characteristics: 
 
Hypothesis #1: The higher the CO2 (GHG) emissions per capita in a DAC donor 
country, the higher the proportion of mitigation finance in its total ODA. 
 
GHG emissions need to be constrained in order to mitigate climate change. The 
provision of finance to mitigate global GHG emissions and a country’s associated 
responsibilities remain debatable and contentious within international climate change 
negotiations. The UNFCCC Convention indicates which factors determine the 
responsibility of a country for financing GHG emission reduction activities. The 
preamble to UNFCCC (1992) states: 
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…the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse 
gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in 
developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global 
emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and 
development needs. 
 
The preamble guides its parties, both developed and developing countries, to 
consider per capita GHG emissions as one of the key measurements guiding efforts to 
protect climate systems. To improve understanding of how developed countries’ 
financing has responded to their UNFCCC commitment, this paper tests the effect of 
donors’ per capita CO2 emissions (as well as other types of GHG emissions) on their 
mitigation finance provision. The data on per capita CO2 emissions were provided by 
Boden et al. (2011) and the rest of the GHG data are taken from the UNFCCC (2012).1 
 
Hypothesis#2: The higher the GDP per capita of a DAC country, the higher the 
proportion of mitigation finance in its total ODA. 
 
In this paper, GDP per capita represents donor’s economic capacity (after 
controlling for population size). Economic capacity is one of the key factors in guiding 
the distribution of global collective effort behind GHG mitigation. The UNFCCC’s 
Article 3 (UNFCCC, 1992) presents a list of principles to which international efforts to 
protect climate systems should adhere and which should be implemented ‘on the basis 
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (UNFCCC, 1992). 
 
Countries with a higher income level are likely to have a better capacity to pay 
for activities supporting global GHG emission reductions (such as energy efficiency 
programmes and development aid facilitating low-carbon development). Hicks et al. 
(2008) find a positive and statistically significant relationship between income per 
capita and brown aid, which produces local benefits, and green aid, which provides 
global benefits. They find that richer countries are generally more generous when 
paying for overseas environmental projects. We test whether this also holds for the 
case of climate mitigation finance. Data on income per capita are provided by the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database (2011).  
 
Hypothesis #3: The better the governance in a DAC country, the higher the proportion 
of mitigation finance in its total ODA. 
 
                                              
1 Appendix 3 presents description and data sources for all variables used in the analysis. Appendix 4 provides 
descriptive statistics and Appendix 5 presents a correlation matrix for all variables. 
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Donors’ good governance practices can be crucial in effectively administering 
public funds in the battle against climate change. It might be the case that donors who 
have an effective and transparent public administration are more likely to display a 
stronger commitment towards climate change mitigation. Papyrakis (2013) for 
example shows how good government institutions correlate with several 
environmental indices (including lower carbon emissions).   
 
To identify whether developed countries with better governance provide more 
mitigation finance, our study includes the average of six of Kaufmann’s institutional 
indices (Kaufmann et al., 2011) in our specifications. We also test separately each of 
all six indices: i.e. the level of regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, 
corruption control, political stability, and government effectiveness. Each index ranges 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to higher quality. All of these 
institutional variables strongly correlate with one another (see Appendix 5). Hence, we 
avoid including multiple governance indices in the same specification in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
 
Hypothesis #4: The higher the number of left-wing party seats in the parliament of a 
DAC country, the higher the proportion of mitigation finance in its total ODA. 
 
Donor governments’ main political views might influence their decisions about 
the relative importance of environmental issues (such as climate mitigation) in their 
national and international agenda. Some studies reach conflicting findings on the 
relationship between political views and environmental related actions. Neumayer 
(2004) finds that left-wing parties and individuals are more pro-environment than their 
counterparts: donor governments with more left-wing representatives tend to have 
stronger environmental policies. On the contrary, Hicks et al.’s (2008) study finds that 
leftist party representation in donor governments has little relevance in decisions about 
the allocation of green aid. They argue that this unexpected outcome is possibly due to 
legislatures being pressurised by local and national environmentalists to allocate more 
funds at home.  
 
Our analysis includes more recent data than the ones used by Hicks et al. (2008) 
and we expect that the supply of mitigation finance increases with stronger leftist 
governments. The data on the political orientation of the government are obtained 
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Thorsten et al., 2001), which uses a 
coding system to classify party orientation with respect to economic policy: (1) 
denotes governments defined as conservative, Christian democratic or right-wing; (2) 
denotes centrist governments and (3), those that are communist, socialist, social 
democratic or otherwise left-wing.  
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Hypothesis #5: The higher the proportion of domestic environmental spending in the 
total government budget of a DAC country, the higher the share of mitigation finance 
in its total ODA. 
 
Donor governments that allocate a large share of their budget towards domestic 
environmental spending might be characterised by a broader environmental 
sensitisation (that can extend also to the case of international climate mitigation 
finance). On the other hand, it might be the case that domestic spending on 
environmental projects might limit the availability of funding for overseas 
environmental activities (see Hicks et al. (2008)). We include the proportion of 
domestic environmental spending in total government national spending in our 
regression analysis in order to test for the sign of any such correlation. Data are 
provided by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF, 2010) Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS).  
 
Other control variables 
 
Other control variables, such as the size of population and the level of democracy, are 
included in the main specifications. It might be the case that larger countries find it 
easier to raise and/or reserve funds for international environmental projects (other 
things equal). Additionally, larger economies tend to bear a larger historical 
responsibility towards the climate change problem. Data on population are taken from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) (2011). The level of democracy is included 
as another control variable. Neumayer (2002) finds that democratic governments 
exhibit stronger commitment to environmental protection than non-democratic ones, 
possibly as a result of being held accountable to their electorates for their spending 
decisions. Democracy is measured using the 0-10 index from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall et al., 2011), with larger values corresponding to higher levels of democracy.  
 
Several additional variables are tested for robustness, namely the CO2 intensity of 
economic activity (i.e. emissions per unit of GDP; hereafter ‘CO2 intensity’), the 
proportion of alternative (i.e. non fossil-fuel based) energy use in the total energy mix, 
and the ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol. For example, donor countries with a 
high-energy intensity may find it easier to meet their Kyoto targets by improving 
energy efficiency overseas rather than financing a more costly energy-saving transition 
at home. The data of CO2 intensity are taken from WDI (2011). We also expect donor 
countries that have adopted green policies domestically and ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
to provide more mitigation finance. We use the proportion of alternative energy use in 
the total energy mix (data taken from WDI (2011)) as a proxy of the ‘greenness’ of 
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domestic energy policy of donor countries. Donor countries that rely more on 
alternative energy technologies may have a stronger incentive to finance a similar 
transition overseas in a concerted global effort to mitigate climate change. To test 
whether donor commitment to the Kyoto Protocol is associated with a higher 
proportion of mitigation finance in total ODA, a 0-1 dummy (kyotoprot) is included as 
an additional control (with 1 corresponding to ratification of the protocol). Data are 
taken from the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (CIESIN-SEDAC, 
2011). Due to its time-invariant characteristic, this variable is only included in our 
random effects models. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We make use of fixed-effects and random-effects models to identify the influence of 
donor characteristics on the proportion of mitigation finance in their total provision of 
ODA (𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑗
). Donor characteristics are captured by the level of CO2 emissions per 
capita, 𝐸𝑖𝑡, the level of wealth, measured by income per capita, 𝐼𝑖𝑡, governance, 𝐺𝑖𝑡, 
the composition of left or right representatives in the national parliament, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 , the 
proportion of environmental expenditure in the government budget, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and a vector 
of other explanatory variables, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 as seen in Eq. (1) below
2.  
 
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑗
=∝0+∝1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ∝2 𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝3 𝐺𝑖𝑡 +∝4 𝐿𝑖𝑡 +∝5 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +∝6 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1). 
 
The superscript j of the dependent variable 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 on the left-hand side denotes 
different measures of mitigation finance; namely the proportion of mitigation finance 
in a country’s total ODA commitment and the proportion of mitigation finance in its 
total aid disbursement (in Section 6 we make use of alternative climate finance 
measures, such as the logarithms of mitigation finance commitment and disbursement, 
ln 𝐴𝑐  and ln 𝐴𝑑 , the disbursement-commitment ratio 
𝐴𝑑
𝐴𝑐
, the logarithm of mixed 
mitigation finance commitment ln 𝐴𝑀𝐼𝑋 , and the proportion of mixed mitigation 
finance in a country’s total aid commitment). The period of analysis for the 
regressions focusing on climate finance commitment and disbursement is 1998-2009 
and 2002-2009 respectively.  
 
The fixed-effects model (FEM) controls for unobserved and time-invariant variables 
𝑎𝑖. The random-effects model (REM) is often used as an alternative to the FEM and 
assumes that individual specific effects are random variables uncorrelated with other 
explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2005, pp. 12-16). We carry out the Hausman test to 
                                              
2 Appendix 5 provides a correlation matrix for all variables included in the analysis. 
Climate Change Economics 
 9 
form a judgment on which of the two estimators is more appropriate for each 
specification. For all specifications, the Hausman test reveals a preference for the FEM 
- nevertheless, we report results for both models as a robustness check. We also run 
collinearity tests across explanatory variables for all specifications using variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) - these ranged between 1.14 and 2.96, indicating low levels of 
collinearity (Puhani, 2000). Lower variance inflation factors typically indicate that the 
model produces robust estimations. 
 
4. The empirics of mitigation finance supply 
 
Table 1 presents empirical results based on our key specifications that link climate 
finance with donor characteristics. The first four columns of Table 1 use mitigation 
finance commitment as the dependent variable. The last four columns repeat the same 
specifications for the case of mitigation finance disbursement. Columns 1 and 3 
(hereafter ‘c1’ and ‘c3’) estimate our basic specification using fixed and random 
effects respectively. These include lnco2pc and lngdppc as explanatory variables, 
which measure the logarithm of CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita 
respectively. While we find donor countries with higher CO2 emissions (in per capita 
terms) displaying higher mitigation finance commitment, the relationship is not 
statistically significant for the richer specification c2 and c4, where we additionally 
control for variation in democratic accountability (democracy), CO2 intensity 
(co2inten), alternative energy (altenergy) and verification of the Kyoto Protocol 
(kyotoprot). Specifications c2 and c4 suggest that donors characterised by a higher 
energy intensity and reliance on alternative energy sources tend to display larger 
mitigation finance commitment.  
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Table 1: Determinants of mitigation finance in total ODA provision  
Dependent variable:  
Share of mitigation 
finance in total ODA, 
1998 to 2009 
Commitment  Disbursement  
Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect 
 
Random effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnco2pc 0.019** 0.001 0.019*** 0.001   -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003   
 (2.947) (0.077) (2.819) (0.074)   (-0.490) (-0.208) (-0.470) (-0.199)   
lngdppc -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002   0.024* 0.018 0.024** 0.018   
 (-0.315) (-0.094) (-0.301) (-0.090)   (2.133) (1.663) (2.046) (1.592)   
govern 0.031*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.055*** -0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.001   
 (4.755) (7.138) (4.549) (6.819)   (-0.588) (0.130) (-0.563) (0.124)   
leftgov -0.003** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004*** 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001   
 (-2.373) (-2.891) (-2.270) (-2.762)   (0.933) (0.451) (0.895) (0.432)   
environexpen -0.024** -0.028** -0.024** -0.028**  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003   
 (-2.405) (-2.445) (-2.301) (-2.336)   (-0.454) (-0.278) (-0.436) (-0.266)   
lnpop 0.009*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
 (3.322) (2.867) (3.178) (2.739)   (0.194) (0.195) (0.186) (0.187)   
democracy  0.000  0.000    0.003  0.003   
  (0.019)  (0.018)    (0.605)  (0.579)   
co2inten  0.040***  0.040***  0.014  0.014*  
  (5.228)  (4.994)    (1.832)  (1.754)   
altenergy  0.001**  0.001***  0.001*  0.001*  
  (3.071)  (2.934)    (1.936)  (1.854)   
kyotoprot   0.066*** 0.068***   0.043*** 0.045*** 
   (12.924) (10.435)     (13.918) (15.620)   
R-Squared (overall) 0.112 0.156 0.441 0.520   0.112 0.070 0.362 0.381   
R-Squared (between) 0.436 0.350 1.000 1.000   0.795 0.448 1.000 1.000   
R-Squared (within) 0.256 0.361 0.256 0.361   0.043 0.072 0.043 0.072   
N 113 113 113 113   94 94 94 94   
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 The level of a donor’s income per capita is negatively correlated with its 
mitigation finance commitment, although the relationship is not statistically significant 
(c1 and c3). This indicates that wealthier donors do not display greater commitment in 
allocating a part of their aid towards mitigation finance, other things equal (this 
finding contradicts Hicks et al. (2008), who, though, base their estimates on pooled 
OLS). We also include in all regressions a measure of governance that can proxy a 
donor government’s institutional capacity for effective administration and policy 
formulation (govern). This appears to positively influence mitigation finance 
commitment and the relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level (see c1-c4). 
This suggests that donors exhibiting better governance at home (e.g. more efficient 
administration and policy-making) pay more attention to global climate problems (in 
terms of mitigation finance commitment).  
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 Furthermore, we include an index capturing the political orientation of the donor 
government, with higher values corresponding to more left-wing government 
orientation (leftgov) – we find the index to be negative and significant at 5%. This is 
significant across all commitment specifications (c2-c4). This finding contradicts that 
of Neumayer (2004), who finds that the strength of a leftist government has a 
significant positive influence on domestic environmental conditions, leading to lower 
level of pollution. As Hicks et al. (2008) argue, leftish donor countries may be 
pressurised by local green NGOs and environmentalists to spend their financial 
resources at home rather than overseas. This is also consistent with the observed 
negative relationship between the proportion of domestic environmental spending in 
total government expenditure (environexpen) and the proportion of mitigation finance 
allocated in total ODA. A 1% drop in the proportion of donor environmental 
expenditure in the government budget, corresponds approximately to a 2.4% rise in 
mitigation finance. This result indicates that a donor’s domestic environmental 
spending may involve a trade-off. Competition between domestic and overseas green 
projects for financial resources may deter governments from generously financing 
activities abroad that will have little and indirect impacts on their electorates. Last, the 
positive and statistically significant of the Kyoto dummy (kyotoprot) suggests that 
ratification of the Kyoto protocol is linked to higher climate mitigation commitment.  
 
In column 5 the focus switches from mitigation finance commitment to its actual 
disbursement. Data on mitigation finance disbursement are available only from 2002 
onwards (hence, the smaller sample size in comparison to the commitment regression 
c1-c4). The disbursement regressions (c5-c8) reveal important discrepancies when 
comparing donor behaviour in terms of original commitment and actual disbursement. 
For the latter, it is only income per capita and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol that 
matters.  
 
Table 2 replicates specification c1 of Table 1 by incorporating in alternate order 
GHGs listed by the UNFCCC other than carbon dioxide (lnco2pc); namely methane 
(lnch4pc), perfluorocarbons (lnpfcspc), hydrofluorocarbons (lnhfcspc) sulphur 
hexafluoride (lnsf6pc) and nitrous oxide (lnn2opc). The lnghgpc variable corresponds 
to the CO2-equivalent aggregate value of all GHG emissions. All measures are in 
logarithmic form and measured on a per capita basis. Table 2 presents only the 
coefficients for these GHG-related variables. While donor countries with a high level 
of overall GHG emissions (lnghgpc) display higher climate finance commitment, this 
does not seem to be the case for other specific subcomponents of GHGs other than 
CO2.   
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Table 2: Determinants of mitigation finance commitment: individual GHG variables 
Dependent variable:  
Share of mitigation finance in 
total ODA (commitment), 
1998 to 2009, N: 107 
Coefficient t-statistic R-squared 
Overall Between Within 
lnghgpc 0.009*** 3.550 0.120 0.376 0.252 
lnch4pc 0.008 1.169 0.104 0.444 0.258 
lnhfcspc -0.010* -2.064 0.085 0.536 0.269 
lnpfcspc -0.005*** -5.322 0.277 0.330 0.332 
lnsf6pc -0.006*** -3.589 0.174 0.111 0.280 
lnn2opc 0.010   1.143 0.095   0.464   0.259   
Notes: lnco2pc, lngdppc, govern, leftgov, environexpen and lnpop are included but not presented. The level of 
carbon emissions per capita is ncluded in all regressions, being the main component of GHGs. Lnco2pc is 
excluded for the lnghgpc specification, given that the former is a component of the latter. The results are robust 
across estimation models. The estimation with REM (available upon request) produces stable signs and 
statistically significant results for these coefficients. The t-statistics are heteroscedasticity-corrected. * and *** 
denote significance at the 10% and 1% level respectively.  
 
It might be the case that the donors characterised by a higher commitment 
towards climate mitigation finance are those with lower emissions of those GHG types 
with the highest global warming potential (namely hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride). Pro-environmental donors may find it 
less complex to first mitigate these more specific and concentrated types of emissions, 
rather than carbon emissions which are produced by almost all economic activities at 
home.  
 
 Table 3 replicates specification c1 of Table 1 when the six disaggregated 
Kaufmann’s World Governance indicators are introduced in alternate order (instead of 
their average value, captured by govern). All indices have positive correlations with 
the proportion of mitigation finance in overall aid provision. Four of them display a 
significant correlation with mitigation finance provision: regulatory quality 
(regulquality), rule of law (ruleoflaw), voice and accountability (voiceaccount), and 
control for corruption (contcorrupt). The other two indices, i.e. political stability 
(polstability) and government effectiveness (goveffective), have the expected sign but 
are statistically insignificant. In general, donors characterised by good institutions and 
governance at home appear to show great commitment towards mitigation finance. 
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Table 3: Determinants of mitigation finance: institutional variables 
 
Dependent variable:  
Share of mitigation finance 
in total ODA (commitment), 
1998 to 2009, N=113 
Coefficient t-statistic R-squared 
   Overall Between  Within 
regulquality 0.024*** 4.190 0.145 0.207 0.225 
ruleoflaw 0.031*** 6.226 0.150 0.286 0.286 
voiceaccount 0.062*** 5.055 0.131 0.153 0.280 
contcorrupt 0.020*** 7.306 0.126 0.364 0.277 
polstability 0.020 1.439 0.099 0.738 0.213 
goveffective 0.010   1.479 0.105   0.470   0.193   
Note: The results above are robust across different estimation models. lnco2pc, lngdppc, leftgov, environexpen 
and lnpop are included but not presented (coefficients in terms of magnitude and significance are similar to the 
ones presented in Table 1, specification c1). The t-statistics are heteroscedasticity-corrected. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
5. Specifications with alternative mitigation finance indices  
 
In this section we replicate specification c1 of Table 1 by making use of alternative 
mitigation finance indices (as the dependent variable to be explained): i.e. the volume 
of mitigation finance commitment, the disbursement-commitment ratio, and the 
proportion of mitigation finance that includes funding addressing biodiversity and 
desertification in total aid. Table 4 presents the corresponding coefficients for carbon 
emissions per capita (lnco2pc), GDP per capita (lngdppc) and total ODA commitment 
or disbursement (lnodacommit, lnodadisburse). 3  When the volume of mitigation 
finance replaces the proportion of mitigation finance in total ODA as the dependent 
variable, all variables become insignificant except for total ODA itself (statistically 
significant at 5%, see Table 4, c9). The increasing amount of mitigation finance is 
mainly determined by increasing total ODA and there is no evidence that it is driven 
by domestic environmental and social factors. Specification c10 uses the volume of 
mitigation finance disbursement as the dependent variable. Again, there is a strong 
positive correlation between total ODA (disbursed) and mitigation finance (disbursed) 
– the level of GDP per capita is also strongly and positively correlated with mitigation 
finance disbursement. Richer donors have more financial resources in their disposal 
for mitigating global emissions at home or abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
3 Results on other coefficients are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4: Alternative mitigation finance variables 
     
Dependent variable Log of mitigation 
finance 
commitment 
1998-09 
(9) 
Log of mitigation 
finance 
disbursement 
2002-09 
(10) 
Mitigation finance 
disbursement-
commitment ratio 
2002-09 
(11) 
lnco2pc 0.248 -0.719 17.388 
 (0.316) (-0.938) (0.720) 
lngdppc 1.658 2.898* -59.468* 
 (0.880) (2.155) (-1.902) 
lnodacommit/ 
lnodadisburse 
1.103** 0.763** 0.316 
 (2.317) (2.646) (0.064) 
 R-squared (overall) 0.445 0.438 0.122 
 R-squared (between) 0.195 0.832 0.145 
 R-squared (within) 0.487 0.459 0.131 
N 113 94 90 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. Log of ODA commitment in the case of commitment and disbursement-commitment 
ratio 
 
 
The disbursement of mitigation finance has historically lagged behind its 
commitment (the disbursement-commitment ratio 
𝐴𝑑
𝐴𝑐
 , for all donors, lies in the range 
of 0.22–0.66). A low ratio indicates poor donor performance in terms of meeting 
commitments. Specification c11 explores whether the magnitude of this ratio depends 
on donor characteristics. The statistical results are again weak, with lngdppc the only 
variable significantly (and negatively) affecting the ratio; in other words, while donor 
countries, whose per capita income is relatively higher, tend to disburse higher 
volumes of mitigation finance (c10), they are also the ones with the larger 
disbursement-commitment gaps (i.e. the ones largely failing to fulfil their targets) 
(c11).  
 
6. Conclusions 
While donors’ commitment to fund climate change activities has increased 
considerably over the last decade, we see that there is still a large gap between 
commitment and actual disbursement. Donors that reserve a larger amount of domestic 
financial resources for environmental purposes display lower commitment towards 
mitigation finance overseas On the other hand. donors with left-wing governments and 
good institutions exhibit stronger commitment towards climate mitigation finance. We 
also find important discrepancies when comparing donor behaviour in terms of 
original commitment and actual disbursement. For the latter, it is only income per 
capita and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol that matters – there is no evidence that a 
high level of CO2 emissions per capita at home influences the disbursement of 
Climate Change Economics 
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mitigation finance. Wealthier donors (i.e. those with a higher level of GDP per capita) 
are the ones characterised by a larger commitment-disbursement gap.   
 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to explain the variation in 
mitigation finance at the donor level. Various extensions of our analysis could be 
further developed. A possible extension of the analysis as a new line of study could 
entail a comparative study between the supply of adaptation finance provided by 
bilateral and multilateral donors (e.g. international organisations). Detailed country-
specific case studies might also shed additional light into the determinants of climate 
finance supply by probing into more detail at how domestic policies on the provision 
of different types of aid are shaped at the country level.  
 
 
Climate Change Economics 
 16 
References  
Alesina A and D Dollar (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5, 33–63. DOI 10.1023/a:1009874203400. 
Ballesteros A and R Moncel (2010). Additionality of climate finance. World Resource 
Institute, Washington DC. 
Baltagi B H (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel data (3rd editions). Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Berthelemy J-C (2006). Aid allocation: Comparing donor’s behaviours. Swedish 
Economic Policy Review, 13, 75–109. 
Bierbaum R and M Fay (2010). World Development Report 2010: Development and 
Climate Change. World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Boden T, G Marland and B Andres (2011). Fossil-Fuel CO2 emissions by nation. 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Boone, North Carolina. URL 
available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_coun.html. Accessed 25 January 
2011. 
Brown J (2010). Fast Start Finance and tracking commitments: where are we now and 
what can be done. Overseas Development Insitute. London. 
Chong A and M Gradstein (2008). What determines foreign aid? The donors’ 
perspective. Journal Development Economics, 87(1), 1–13. DOI 
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.08.001. 
CIESIN-SEDAC (2011). Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI). 
CIESIN, Columbia University. Palisades, New York. 
Hicks R L, B C Parks, J T Roberts and M J Tierney (2008). The political market for 
environmental aid: Why some donors are greener than others. In Greening Aid?: 
Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance, (1), 159–
183). New York: Oxford University Press. DOI 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213948.003.0006. 
Hoeffler A and V Outram (2011). Need, merit, or self-interest: What determines the 
allocation of aid? Review of Development Economics, 15(2), 237–250. DOI 
10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00605.x 
ICTSD (2010). “Fast Start” climate funding ODA? International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development 
IMF (2010). International Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics (IMF GFS). 
Washington DC. URL available at http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170809. Accessed 30 June 2011. 
Climate Change Economics 
 17 
Kaufmann D, A Kraay and M Mastruzzi (2010). The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 5430. The World Bank Development Research Group 
Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Washington DC. URL available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports 
Lewis T L (2003). Environmental aid: Driven by recipient need or donor interests? 
Social Science Quarterly, 84, 144–161. DOI 10.1111/1540-6237.8401009-i1. 
Maizels A and M K Nissanke (1984). Motivations for aid to developing countries. 
World Development, 12, 879–900. DOI 10.1016/0305-750x(84)90046-9 
Marshall M G, K Jaggers and TR Gurr (2011). Polity IV project: Political regime 
characteristics and transitions 1800-2010. Societal-Systems Research Inc. and 
Colorado State University and University of Maryland. URL available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. Accessed 27 June 2011. 
McKinlay R D and R Little (1977). A Foreign policy model of U.S. Bilateral aid 
allocation. World Politics, 30(1), 58–86. URL available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010075. 
Michaelowa A and K Michaelowa (2007). Does climate policy promote development? 
Climatic Change, 84(1), 1–4. DOI 10.1007/s10584-007-9266-z. 
Neumayer E (2002). Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental 
commitment? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Peace Research, 39(2), 139–
164. doi:10.1177/0022343302039002001 
Neumayer E (2004). The environment, left-wing political orientation and ecological 
economics. Ecological Economics, 51(3-4), 167–175. DOI 
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.06.006 
OECD (2011a). OECD Creditor Rating System (CRS) database. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris. URL available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1. Accessed 20 April 2011. 
OECD (2011b). Development Assistance Committee Members’ Net Official 
Development Assistance. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. Paris. Accessed 20 April 2011. 
Papyrakis E (2013). Environmental Performance in Socially Fragmented Countries. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 55(1), 119–140. DOI 10.1007/s10640-
012-9619-6 
 Puhani P A (2000). The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 14(1).  
Climate Change Economics 
 18 
Thorsten B, G Clarke, A Groff, P Keefer and P Walsh (2001). New tools in 
comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions, 15(1), 165-
176,World Bank Economic Review. URL available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,c
ontentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.
html. Accessed 20 June 2011. 
Trumbull W N and HJ Wall (1994). Estimating aid-allocation criteria with panel data. 
The Economic Journal, 104(425), 876–882. URL available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2234981 
UNFCCC (1992). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 GE.05-62220 (E) 200705. United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. URL available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 
UNFCCC. (2012). GHG data from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. URL available at 
http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php. Accessed 21 June 21 
2013. 
WDI (2011). World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2011. World Bank. 
Washington, DC. URL available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?so
urce=world-development-indicators. Accessed 27 June 2011. 
Climate Change Economics 
 19 
APPENDIX 1: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION DATA 
 
 
Fig. A shows an increase in the reporting of mitigation finance data over time, 
although some countries have consistently under-reported it. For example, Japan has 
only nine years of available data on projects purely addressing emission mitigation and 
projects whose objective is mitigation combined with combating desertification and 
protecting biodiversity (Fig. B). Norway is the only donor that consistently reports its 
ODA projects, according to the Rio Marker CRS, and hence has a full 12 years of data 
of reporting on all the Rio Markers.  
 
 
 
Figure A. Number of donors reporting mitigation finance commitment and 
disbursement 
 
  
 
Figure B. Number of reporting years by each donor for each Rio Marker objective 
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APPENDIX 2: DONORS' COMMITMENT AND DISBURSEMENT TO 
MITIGATION FINANCE (1998-2009) 
 
 
 In million US$ constant 2009 prices 
Year Mixed mitigation 
finance 
 
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4) 
Only mitigation 
finance 
 
 
(1) 
Biodiversity and 
mitigation 
finance  
 
(2) 
Desertification and 
mitigation finance 
 
(3) 
Biodiversity, 
desertification, 
and mitigation 
finance 
(4) 
 C D C D C D C D C D 
1998 1249.7  499.8  213.1  286.3  250.5  
1999 1682.4  1055.7  214.6  88.4  323.7  
2000 867.9  346.9  225.0  28.0  268.0  
2001 2200.9  1490.4  208.2  52.5  449.7  
2002 2020.3 668.5 1121.8 287.2 474.1 105.5 24.8 44.7 399.6 231.1 
2003 3955.9 1033.0 2941.5 646.1 210.4 150.8 38.0 48.6 766.1 187.4 
2004 3480.6 1474.1 2731.8 968.8 155.1 124.0 47.6 67.6 546.0 313.7 
2005 4438.6 1440.9 3324.7 1096.4 186.0 105.6 58.6 19.0 869.3 219.9 
2006 4119.6 2022.7 2794.5 1423.4 264.4 116.2 112.3 24.7 948.4 458.4 
2007 4061.9 2619.8 2703.7 1780.2 313.0 200.9 48.6 35.0 996.6 603.6 
2008 7919.8 5138.3 6308.3 3890.8 258.8 266.6 215.4 71.7 1137.2 909.2 
2009 9205.6 5429.1 7369.0 4255.1 1191.3 530.0 128.6 74.3 516.6 569.8 
Note: C = commitment; D = disbursement 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
 
Type of Variable 
 
Variable label Definition Data Source 
Mitigation finance  
 
sharemfodacom
mit 
sharemfodadisb
urse 
1. Proportion of mitigation finance in total ODA 
commitment disbursement 
2.  
OECD (2011a, 
2011b) 
 lnmfcommit  
lnmfdisburse  
 
 
3. Log of the amount of mitigation finance 
commitment disbursement in constant US$ 
2009 prices (mitigation marker is coded as 
principal and significant) 
OECD (2011a) 
 mfdcratio 4. The amount of mitigation finance disbursement 
divided by the amount of mitigation finance 
commitment in constant US$ 2009 prices 
Author’s calculation 
using the data from 
OECD (2011a) 
 lnmixedcf 5. Log of the amount of mixed mitigation finance 
in constant US$ 2009 (i.e. mitigation finance 
provided for activities that exclusively focus on 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, as 
well as for activities that relate both to climate 
change as well as biodiversity and 
desertification (i.e. categories 1, 4, 5 and 6 of 
the Rio Marker) 
OECD (2011a) 
Carbon emissions 
 
lnghgpc Log of the total six types of emissions listed 
below in thousand metric tons of carbon divided 
by total population 
Author’s calculation 
using the data from 
Boden et al. (2011) 
 lnco2pc Log of carbon dioxide (CO2) in thousand metric 
tons of carbon divided by total population 
(ibid.) 
 lnch4pc Log of methane (CH4) in thousand metric tons 
of CO2 equivalent divided by total population 
UNFCCC (2012) 
 lnpfcspc Log of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) in thousand 
metric tons of CO2 equivalent divided by total 
population 
 
 lnhfcspc Log of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in thousand 
metric tons of CO2 equivalent divided by total 
population 
 
 lnsf6pc Log of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in thousand 
metric tons of CO2 equivalent divided by total 
population 
 
 lnn2opc Log of nitrous oxide (N2O) in thousand metric 
tons of c CO2 equivalent divided by total 
population 
 
 co2inten CO2 intensity (kg per kg of oil equivalent energy 
use) 
 
WDI (2011) 
 altenergy Alternative and nuclear energy (% of total 
energy use) 
(ibid) 
Level of wealth  lngdppc Log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita in constant US$ 2009 
(ibid) 
Institutional measures govern The average of six Kaufmann’s World 
Governance Indicators (listed below). Each 
indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 (max) 
Author’s calculation 
based on (Kaufmann 
et al., 2010) 
 regulquality 
 
Regulatory quality captures the ability of 
government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
 ruleoflaw Rule of law index captures the extent to which (ibid) 
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 agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, as well as the quality of contract 
enforcement and property rights  
 voiceaccount 
 
Voice and accountability captures the extent to 
which citizens can participate in government 
selection procedures and have freedom of 
expression and association  
(ibid) 
 contcorrupt 
 
Control of corruption captures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests  
(ibid) 
 polstability 
 
Political stability captures perceptions on the 
likelihood that governments become destabilised 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means 
(ibid) 
 goveffective Government effectiveness that captures the 
quality of public services and policy 
formulation, as well as the degree of government 
commitment to policies. 
(ibid) 
Environmental 
expenditure  
environexpen Proportion of environmental expenditure in 
national budget 
IMF (2010) 
    
Kyoto protocol 
ratification  
kyotoprot Kyoto protocol ratification; coded 1 if ratified; 
coded 0 otherwise 
CIESIN-SEDAC 
(2011) 
    
Composition of donor 
government 
leftgov Coded: (1) conservative, Christian democratic, 
or right-wing; (2) centrist and (3) communist, 
socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Annual 
data covers the period 1975-2010  
Thorsten et al. 
(2001) 
Level of democracy  
 
democracy 0 to 10 index, where higher values correspond to 
more democratic states  
Marshall et al. 
(2011) 
Total ODA lnodacommit 
lnodadisburse 
Log of total ODA commitment/disbursement in 
constant US$ 2009 
OECD (2011b) 
Population lnpop Log of population size WDI (2011) 
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APPENDIX 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variable label 
 
No of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
      
sharemfodacommit 199 0.022 0.035 0.000 0.267 
sharemfodadisburse 142 0.016 0.025 0.000 0.143 
sharetotcfodacommit 215 0.037 0.047 0.000 0.292 
lnmfcommit 199 2.585 2.594 -5.409 8.290 
lnmfdisburse 142 2.429 2.234 -3.285 7.655 
lnodacommit 264 7.472 1.315 4.667 10.371 
lnodadisburse 176 7.535 1.301 5.013 10.272 
mfdcratio 137 4.667 19.993 0.023 190.649 
lntotalmf 215 3.328 2.218 -4.280 8.376 
lnghgpc 241 -4.526 0.4825 -5.961 -3.260 
lnco2pc 264 2.229 0.336 1.548 3.008 
lnch4pc 241 -6.766 0.834 -8.717 -4.926 
lnhfcspc 241 -9.040 0.545 -11.041 -7.428 
lnpfcspc 240 -11.271 2.169 -19.684 -8.001 
lnsf6pc 241 -11.095 1.187 -14.398 -8.234 
lnn2opc 241 -7.013 0.572 -8.639 -5.912 
co2inten 264 2.238 0.548 0.960 3.427 
altenergy 264 16.815 14.247 0.554 50.734 
lngdppc 264 10.393 0.205 9.743 10.933 
enviroexpen 172 0.512 0.330 -0.458 1.617 
kyotoprot 264 0.417 0.494 0.000 1.000 
leftgov 251 1.956 0.935 1.000 3.000 
democracy 264 9.841 0.498 8.000 10.000 
lnpop 264 16.776 1.212 15.127 19.542 
govern 210 1.398 0.360 0.502 1.913 
regulquality 210 1.402 0.317 0.537 2.012 
ruleoflaw 220 1.503 0.379 0.313 1.964 
voiceaccount 220 1.345 0.254 0.609 1.827 
contcorrupt 220 1.634 0.587 0.156 2.466 
polstability 220 0.927 0.371 -0.180 1.577 
goveffective 220 1.592 0.426 0.316 2.237 
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APPENDIX 5: CORRELATION MATRIX 
 sharemfoda sharemfdisburse totmfodashare lnmfcommit lnmfdisburse mfdcratio lntotalmf 
mfdisburse 0.7477* 1.0000 
     
 
0.0000 
      totmfodashare 0.8975* 0.6717* 1.0000 
    
 
0.0000 0.0000 
     lnmfcommit 0.7025* 0.5251* 0.6801* 1.0000 
   
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    lnmfdisburse 0.6914* 0.7002* 0.6485* 0.8700* 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   mfdcratio -0.1308 0.0487 -0.1507 -0.3745* -0.0480 1.0000 
 
 
0.1276 0.5720 0.0789 0.0000 0.5774 
  lntotalmf 0.6964* 0.5043* 0.7502* 0.9159* 0.8266* -0.2809* 1.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 
 lnodacommit 0.3881* 0.2436* 0.3039* 0.6692* 0.6652* -0.1747 0.6571* 
 
0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0412 0.0000 
lnodadisburse 0.3864* 0.2362* 0.3087* 0.6753* 0.6604* -0.1794 0.6490* 
 
0.0000 0.0047 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0359 0.0000 
lnghgpc -0.0608 -0.2089 -0.0240 -0.0083 -0.0991 -0.0354 0.0196 
 
0.4061 0.0162 0.7332 0.9094 0.2582 0.6932 0.7810 
lnco2pc -0.0186 -0.1387 0.0498 0.0835 0.0299 -0.0127 0.1384 
 
0.7939 0.0997 0.4672 0.2412 0.7239 0.8833 0.0427 
lnch4pc -0.4124* -0.3941* -0.3566* -0.3553* -0.4274* 0.0155 -0.3654* 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8625 0.0000 
lnhfcspc -0.0084 -0.0840 -0.0053 0.1226 0.0783 -0.0888 0.1697 
 
0.9083 0.3382 0.9397 0.0928 0.3722 0.3206 0.0152 
lnpfcspc 0.0344 -0.0501 -0.0018 0.2924* 0.2236 -0.3431* 0.2684* 
 
0.6397 0.5696 0.9802 0.0000 0.0103 0.0001 0.0001 
lnsf6pc 0.1190 0.0010 0.1002 0.3985* 0.3785* -0.2383* 0.3323* 
 
0.1030 0.9906 0.1538 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070 0.0000 
lnn2opc -0.4245* -0.4321* -0.3138* -0.3126* -0.4012* 0.0028 -0.3286* 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9752 0.0000 
carboninten 0.0661 -0.0308 0.0394 -0.0705 -0.1604 0.0073 -0.0864 
 
0.3535 0.7162 0.5656 0.3221 0.0566 0.9328 0.2068 
altenergy -0.0174 0.0792 -0.0730 0.1080 0.1823 -0.0989 0.0683 
 
0.8077 0.3488 0.2865 0.1291 0.0299 0.2502 0.3185 
lngdppc 0.0341 0.0437 0.0695 0.3340* 0.3814* -0.1886 0.3028* 
 
0.6328 0.6057 0.3103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0273 0.0000 
enviroexpen -0.1377 -0.0136 -0.0633 0.0135 0.1090 0.0748 -0.1249 
 
0.1153 0.8956 0.4479 0.8782 0.2929 0.4808 0.1330 
kyotoprot 0.1521 0.2444* 0.1811* 0.1629 0.2870* -0.0310 0.2325* 
 
0.0320 0.0034 0.0078 0.0215 0.0005 0.7193 0.0006 
leftgov -0.1502 -0.0335 -0.1406 -0.1471 -0.1325 0.1019 -0.1591 
 
0.0401 0.6993 0.0455 0.0445 0.1254 0.2485 0.0234 
democracy -0.0159 -0.0390 -0.0384 -0.0981 -0.0715 0.0647 -0.1077 
 
0.8238 0.6453 0.5753 0.1680 0.3981 0.4524 0.1155 
lnpop 0.2861* 0.1710 0.1695 0.4226* 0.4228* -0.1136 0.4192* 
 
0.0000 0.0419 0.0128 0.0000 0.0000 0.1864 0.0000 
govern -0.0820 -0.1578 0.0136 0.0341 0.0007 0.0464 0.0256 
 
0.2837 0.0607 0.8563 0.6558 0.9934 0.5902 0.7342 
regulquality -0.1416 -0.2270* -0.0465 -0.0153 -0.0497 0.0655 0.0008 
 
0.0631 0.0066 0.5367 0.8415 0.5572 0.4473 0.9919 
ruleoflaw -0.0093 -0.0755 0.0562 0.1361 0.1181 -0.0185 0.1002 
 
0.9036 0.3718 0.4458 0.0742 0.1616 0.8300 0.1735 
voiceaccount -0.1640 -0.1998 -0.0773 -0.0638 -0.0924 0.0728 -0.0528 
 
0.0311 0.0171 0.2943 0.4041 0.2739 0.3980 0.4745 
contcorrupt -0.0521 -0.1188 0.0521 0.0745 0.0634 0.0385 0.0733 
 
0.4961 0.1592 0.4804 0.3300 0.4537 0.6552 0.3201 
polstability -0.0159 -0.1049 0.0391 -0.0702 -0.1130 0.1034 -0.0919 
 
0.8354 0.2142 0.5964 0.3584 0.1807 0.2291 0.2122 
goveffective -0.1120 -0.1762 -0.0194 0.0519 -0.0042 0.0155 0.0319 
 
0.1424 0.0359 0.7923 0.4976 0.9601 0.8574 0.6657 
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 lnodacommit lnodadisburse lnghgpc lnco2pc lnch4pc lnhfcspc lnpfcspc 
lnodadisburse 0.9896* 1.0000 
     
 
0.0000 
      lnghgpc 0.1072 0.1024 1.0000 
    
 
0.0967 0.1974 
     lnco2pc 0.2364* 0.2178* 0.8489* 1.0000 
   
 
0.0001 0.0037 0.0000 
    lnch4pc -0.3776* -0.3803* 0.5920* 0.4878* 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   lnhfcspc 0.4663* 0.3686* 0.3837* 0.4135* 0.1610 1.0000 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0123 
  lnpfcspc 0.3410* 0.3445* 0.2588* 0.3844* 0.1169 0.2325* 1.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0707 0.0003 
 lnsf6pc 0.4754* 0.5393* 0.2230* 0.3675* -0.1574 0.2156* 0.6795* 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0144 0.0008 0.0000 
lnn2opc -0.3826* -0.3834* 0.4547* 0.3910* 0.8533* 0.1363 0.2059* 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0344 0.0013 
carboninten -0.1651* -0.1317 0.6713* 0.4261* 0.3272* 0.1221 -0.0929 
 
0.0072 0.0815 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0584 0.1513 
altenergy 0.1699* 0.1527 -0.5932* -0.4255* -0.2431* -0.0949 0.2299* 
 
0.0057 0.0430 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.1417 0.0003 
lngdppc 0.5054* 0.4753* 0.0767 0.2395* -0.0156 0.3141* 0.4672* 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.2356 0.0001 0.8101 0.0000 0.0000 
enviroexpen -0.1438 -0.0775 0.3094* 0.2271* 0.3804* 0.0283 -0.0283 
 
0.0598 0.4104 0.0001 0.0027 0.0000 0.7218 0.7220 
kyotoprot 0.1705* 0.1027 -0.0868 -0.0469 -0.0744 0.3434* -0.0945 
 
0.0055 0.1750 0.1795 0.4482 0.2499 0.0000 0.1444 
leftgov -0.1674* -0.1903 -0.1069 -0.1091 0.1571 -0.0573 -0.1628 
 
0.0079 0.0137 0.1065 0.0844 0.0174 0.3878 0.0139 
democracy 0.0759 0.1220 0.0603 0.0917 0.0915 -0.1287 -0.0717 
 
0.2188 0.1067 0.3511 0.1373 0.1567 0.0460 0.2682 
lnpop 0.7114* 0.7075* 0.2403* 0.2812* -0.2398* 0.3961* 0.1538 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0171 
govern 0.0628 0.0692 0.0600 0.1213 0.3070* 0.0498 0.0846 
 
0.3653 0.3726 0.4106 0.0794 0.0000 0.4946 0.2469 
regulquality 0.0918 0.1086 0.2631* 0.2280* 0.4467* 0.3188* 0.0110 
 
0.1852 0.1611 0.0002 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.8805 
ruleoflaw 0.1346 0.1410 0.0659 0.1576 0.2597* 0.1484 0.1441 
 
0.0462 0.0619 0.3541 0.0193 0.0002 0.0360 0.0422 
voiceaccount -0.0242 0.0140 -0.0106 0.0315 0.3421* -0.0371 -0.0321 
 
0.7208 0.8537 0.8816 0.6417 0.0000 0.6017 0.6525 
contcorrupt 0.1026 0.1307 0.0405 0.1108 0.2751* 0.0928 0.0524 
 
0.1294 0.0838 0.5692 0.1013 0.0001 0.1911 0.4623 
polstability -0.2128* -0.2554* -0.1223 -0.0379 0.0810 -0.4070* 0.0197 
 
0.0015 0.0006 0.0844 0.5761 0.2539 0.0000 0.7829 
goveffective 0.1353 0.1334 0.0937 0.1689 0.2204* 0.1343 0.1891* 
 
0.0451 0.0775 0.1870 0.0121 0.0017 0.0579 0.0075 
 
 
` 
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 lnsf6pc lnn2opc co2inten altenergy lngdppc enviroexpen kyotoprot 
lnn2opc -0.0699 1.0000 
     
 
0.2796 
      co2inten -0.1070 0.0803 1.0000 
    
 
0.0976 0.2140 
     altenergy 0.2010* -0.0743 -0.8938* 1.0000 
   
 
0.0017 0.2503 0.0000 
    lngdppc 0.5024* 0.0398 -0.2598* 0.2427* 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 0.5390 0.0000 0.0001 
   enviroexpen -0.0174 0.3340* 0.2854* -0.3874* 0.1609 1.0000 
 
 
0.8267 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0350 
  kyotoprot -0.1524 -0.1236 -0.0500 0.0048 0.2872* 0.0825 1.0000 
 
0.0179 0.0554 0.4187 0.9385 0.0000 0.2822 
 leftgov -0.0884 0.1741* -0.0563 0.0341 -0.1980* 0.0441 -0.1512 
 
0.1823 0.0083 0.3745 0.5903 0.0016 0.5664 0.0165 
democracy -0.0373 0.0021 0.1489 -0.1924* 0.3512* 0.2175* -0.0541 
 
0.5645 0.9747 0.0154 0.0017 0.0000 0.0042 0.3816 
lnpop 0.3221* -0.3849* 0.1840* -0.1055 -0.0584 -0.2904* 0.0168 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0872 0.3448 0.0001 0.7861 
govern 0.1558 0.4754* -0.4226* 0.2682* 0.4990* 0.2688* -0.1022 
 
0.0318 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0017 0.1400 
regulquality 0.0437 0.5204* -0.2205* 0.0326 0.4284* 0.4252* 0.0114 
 
0.5490 0.0000 0.0013 0.6380 0.0000 0.0000 0.8690 
ruleoflaw 0.2840* 0.3789* -0.3935* 0.2956* 0.5465* 0.2349* -0.0111 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.8701 
voiceaccount -0.0625 0.4967* -0.3542* 0.2050* 0.4718* 0.1548 -0.0595 
 
0.3790 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0649 0.3800 
contcorrupt 0.1579 0.4144* -0.3968* 0.2562* 0.4773* 0.1971 -0.0708 
 
0.0256 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0183 0.2958 
polstability 0.0389 0.1953* -0.3079* 0.1977* 0.2587* 0.2028 -0.2191* 
 
0.5840 0.0056 0.0000 0.0032 0.0001 0.0151 0.0011 
goveffective 0.2358* 0.4182* -0.4180* 0.3115* 0.4932* 0.1651 -0.1647 
 
0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0488 0.0144 
 
 leftgov democracy lnpop govern regulquality ruleoflaw 
democracy 0.0883 1.0000 
    
 
0.1631 
     lnpop -0.1029 -0.2029* 1.0000 
   
 
0.1039 0.0009 
    govern 0.1183 0.4331* -0.4915* 1.0000 
  
 
0.0960 0.0000 0.0000 
   regulquality 0.1475 0.3858* -0.3225* 0.8839* 1.0000 
 
 
0.0377 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  ruleoflaw 0.0822 0.3462* -0.4031* 0.9540* 0.8404* 1.0000 
 
0.2367 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 voiceaccount 0.1270 0.5014* -0.5439* 0.8908* 0.7771* 0.7863* 
 
0.0670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
contcorrupt 0.1551 0.4332* -0.4151* 0.9780* 0.8747* 0.9355* 
 
0.0249 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
polstability 0.1092 0.4248* -0.6127* 0.7626* 0.4943* 0.6564* 
 
0.1155 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
goveffective 0.0245 0.3001* -0.3764* 0.9404* 0.8207* 0.8960* 
 
0.7249 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 voiceaccount contcorrupt polstability goveffective 
contcorrupt 0.8577* 1.0000 
  
 
0.0000 
   polstability 0.6537* 0.6665* 1.0000 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
  goveffective 0.7952* 0.8972* 0.6335* 1.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Note: * denotes significance at 5% level. 
